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MUCH ADO ABOUT TWOMBLY? A STUDY ON THE
IMPACT OF BELL ATLANTIC CORP. V.
TWOMBLY ON 12(b) (6) MOTIONS
Kendall W. Hannon*
[E]very man who is injured will be sure to find a method of relief,




I fear that every age must learn its lesson that special pleading can-
not be made to do the service of trial and that live issues between
active litigants are not to be disposed of or evaded on the paper
pleadings ....
-Judge Charles E. Clark
2
INTRODUCTION
Serving as the gate through which all disputes must pass, plead-
ings are fundamental to the operation of the federal judiciary. The
standards that federal courts employ to evaluate the sufficiency of
these pleadings can frame issues, control access to the promised land
of liberal discovery, and shape settlement proceedings. Thus, when
the United States Supreme Court recently spoke on this issue in the
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2009; B.A., Arabic and
Political Science, University of Notre Dame, 2006. I would like to thank ProfessorJay
Tidmarsh for his tireless assistance and encouragement throughout this project as
well as Dean Margaret Brinig for her assistance with crafting the appropriate statistical
analysis. I would also like to thank my wife, Kristin Hannon for her patience and
support.
I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *184. This is an example of Blackstone
"marveling at the perfection of the common law writs." Fred T. Hanson, The Secured
Creditor's Share of an Insolvent Estate, 34 MICH. L. REv. 309, 329 (1936).
2 CHARLES E. CLARK, Special Pleading in the "Big Case"?, 21 F.R.D. 45, 46 (1957),
reprinted in PROCEDURE, THE HANDMAID OFJUSTICE 147-48 (Charles A. Wright & Harry
M. Reasoner eds., 1965).
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case of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,3 the American bar rightfully took
notice.
Twombly is the latest chapter in an evolving American pleading
system. At its early common law stage, pleading in the United States
was formalistic to the point of "subordinat[ing] substance to form."
4
An individual desiring to bring a suit had to decide upon, and state by
writ, the "proper form of action."'5 The forms of action required particu-
lar acts to be alleged, often in specific phraseology; failure to comply
was an "incurable defect."6 This pleading system proved unable to
support a growing field of substantive law and rights. Expanding sub-
stantive law combined with a stagnant pleading system caused the
pleadings to take on a character detached from the realities of the
case. 7 The ultimate result at common law was a complex, verbose,
and convoluted pleading that did not make clear what, exactly, the
suit was predicated on.8
In the face of such realities the state legislatures felt compelled to
take action. Beginning with New York's "Field Code" (named after its
creator David Dudley Field), legislatures did away with the formalism
that had come to characterize common law pleading and replaced it
with a system of code pleading.9 By requiring that pleadings merely
disclose the material facts of a dispute, the drafters hoped the Code
3 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
4 CHARLES M. HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN
AMERICA AND ENGLAND 31 (Cincinnati, Ohio, W.H. Anderson & Co. 1897).
5 1 JOSEPH CHIyrv, A TREATISE ON PLEADING AND PARTIES TO AcTIONS 94 (Spring-
field, Mass., G. & C. Merriam 15th American ed. 1874).
6 See, e.g., JAMES GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL
AcIONS 174 (Albany, William Gould, Jr., & Co. 5th ed. 1887) (describing how, to
bring a suit for a forcible injury, the complaint had to allege that "the wrongful act
[was] committed 'with force and arms,' and 'against the peace"').
7 See HEPBURN, supra note 4, at 20 ("The existing remedies became inadequate
for the proper administration of primary rights .... "). Attempting to shoehorn
"new" law into the "old" pleading structure, attorneys and courts began to rely largely
on "legal fiction[s]" that produced pleadings that bore little resemblance to the
actual dispute. See id. at 25.
8 See id. at 58; see also FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.3, at 185
(5th ed. 2001) (stating that "wholly fictional recitals prefaced the real punch line" and
that "[i] n many situations.., there was often little or no correspondence between the
facts alleged and those that appeared at trial").
9 SeeJAMES ET AL., supra note 8, § 3.5, at 186. The changes wrought by the Field
Code included an abolition of distinctions between suits in equity and law and the
"substitution of concise and plain statements of the substantive facts of a case for the
technical and verbose pleadings of the older systems." HEPBURN, supra note 4, at 92.
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would serve the end of reaching just determinations on the merits.' 0
Pleadings under the early codes required that only "material operative
facts" be pleaded; conclusions of law and "evidential facts" were not to
be included." Unfortunately, making these distinctions proved diffi-
cult, and a "whole new corpus of legal technicality at the pleading
stage" developed. '
2
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, largely drafted by (future
federal judge) Charles Clark in the 1930s, instituted the concept of
notice pleading throughout the federal judicial system. 13 Among the
Federal Rules is Rule 8(a) (2), which defines some of the requirements
of a complaint. It states that the pleader must provide a "short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief."' 4 Rule 8 was designed both to move away from the "semantic
quibbling" that existed under code pleading systems and to ease the
pleader's burden.' 5 In one of its earliest evaluations of Rule 8's
requirements, the Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson16 held that a
challenge to the sufficiency of a complaint should only be upheld if "it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts...
which would entitle him to relief.' 7 With this decision, the Supreme
Court articulated a liberal test for judging the sufficiency of plead-
10 See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 11, at 28
(1928).
11 Id. § 38, at 150
12 JAMES ET AL., supra note 8, § 3.5, at 187 (citing CLARK, supra note 10, § 38, at
150).
13 SeeJACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CRWvL PROCEDURE § 5.1, at 253 (4th ed. 2005);
Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE
L.J. 914, 915 (1976). "Notice pleading" followsJudge Clark's reasoning that pleadings
should "not be objectionable ... so long as reasonably fair notice of the pleader's
cause of action is given." CLARK, supra note 10, § 38, at 157. Notice pleading existed
within the federal system prior to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal
Equity Rule 25, adopted by the United States Supreme Court in 1912, required a
plaintiff before an equity court to state "a short and simple statement of the ultimate
facts upon which the plaintiff asks relief." FED. EQurrY R. 25. Rule 8 took this princi-
ple and applied it beyond the limited scope of the equity rules. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8.
14 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
15 JAMES ET AL., supra note 8, § 3.6, at 187. Rule 8(f) also is indicative of the
"liberal" pleading standard under the Federal Rules. It states that "all pleadings shall
be so construed as to do substantial justice." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(f). American pleading,
therefore, had moved from a system where substance was sacrificed for form to a
system where the opposite was true.
16 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955
(2007). For an in-depth discussion on Conley, see infra Part I.A.
17 Conley, 355 U.S. at 46.
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ings-a test that would dominate the federal judiciary for the next
fifty years.' 8
And then came Twombly. In discussing this case, only one thing is
certain: practicing attorneys must learn new language for their
motions, briefs, and oral arguments. The fifty-year-old Conley "no set
of facts" language has, apparently, "earned its retirement"-replaced
with a general requirement that the pleader's claim be "plausible."'19
Carefully scrutinizing the decision, legal academics have attempted to
define the scope and possible effects of this new plausibility language,
often reaching different conclusions. For the practicing attorney,
however, it is ultimately the judge's interpretation, not the professor's,
which will decide the fate of their complaint or motion to dismiss.
Unfortunately, faced with interpreting Twombly, many judges
have found uncertainty and confusion.20 As a result, neither Twombly
nor its progeny provide a clear statement as to the substantive, practi-
cal requirements a complaint must meet. Attorneys filing complaints
or responding to motions to dismiss thus face a considerable chal-
lenge as they attempt to plead through equivocal judicial precedents.
This Note, an empirical study, seeks to inject concrete facts into this
abstract reality. The question behind this study is a simple one: does
Twombly simply bring a linguistic reformulation of a familiar standard
or is it imposing its own, new standard? To answer this question, this
study looks at how the district courts, the frontline interpreters of any
pleading language, have treated the nascent Twombly decision. The
12 (b) (6) motion to dismiss provides a convenient medium to evaluate
Twombly's effect.2 1 Generally, any substantive alteration to the plead-
ing standard would have an effect on the dismissal rate under
12(b) (6), while mere semantic changes would leave the dismissal rate
largely unchanged. 2
2
The results of this study lead to three conclusions. First, while
some commentators have suggested that Twombly will only apply in
the antitrust context, this study shows that courts have applied the
18 See Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering Summary
Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 81, 143 (2006)
(showing Conley to be the fourth most cited case in the federal judiciary).
19 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966, 1969.
20 See, e.g., Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007); Temple v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., Nos. 06 CV 5303 (JG), 06 CV 5304(0G), 2007 WL 2790154, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 24, 2007).
21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) states: "Every defense ... to a claim for
relief in any pleading ... shall be asserted in the responsive pleading ... except that
the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: . . . (6)
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ...." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
22 An exception to this general premise is discussed infra Part IV.C.
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decision in every substantive area of law governed by Rule 8. Antitrust
cases comprised only 3.7% (40 out of 1075) of all cases citing Twombly
in this study; the remainder is representative of every substantive area
of law. Second, despite sweeping language and the "retirement" of
fifty-year-old language, the new linguistic veneer that the Court has
placed on Rule 8(a) and 12(b) (6) appears to have had almost no sub-
stantive impact. Third, the one area in which this study does show a
significant departure from previous dismissal practice is the civil rights
field. The rate of dismissal in civil rights cases has spiked in the four
months since Twombly.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I provides context for the
study by examining the important Supreme Court precedents both
before and after Twombly as well as the response to Twombly in the
legal literature. Part II discusses the methodology of the empirical
study, while Part III presents the findings of the study in a variety of
ways. Finally, Part IV seeks to advance various hypotheses that could
each serve to explain the findings encountered in the study.
I. THE HISTORICAL AND ACADEMIC CONTEXT
The Federal Rules, with their basic pleading standard embodied
in Rule 8, were promulgated in 1938.231 They were not, however, self-
executing-the federal district courts were charged the task of inter-
preting and applying them. The actual text of Rule 8(a) (2) does not
differ greatly from what was required under code pleading systems.
24
In fact, in the early years of the Federal Rules, some federal courts
resisted accepting that the Federal Rules required a more liberal
pleading standard.25 Overwhelmingly, however, the Federal Rules
were successful in ushering in a liberal, less technical pleading stan-
dard that allowed for a "great variety of pleading techniques."
26
23 See Jay Tidmarsh, Pound's Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 513, 572
(2006).
24 See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 13, § 5.7, at 267.
25 See id. § 5.8, at 269. Friedenthal cites two early district court cases: Employers'
Mutual Liability Insurance Co. of Wisconsin v. Blue Line Transfer Co., 2 F.R.D. 121 (W.D.
Mo. 1941) and Washburn v. Moorman Manufacturing Co., 25 F. Supp. 546 (S.D. Cal.
1938). These cases explicitly required that plaintiffs plead facts with specificity and
found the sample pleading forms in the Federal Rules to be nonbinding. In Wash-
burn, the complaint was dismissed despite the fact the complaint was based on the
form complaint. See id. at 546; see also Employers' Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 2 F.R.D. at 123
("[T]hese forms do not dispense with the necessity, as occasion may require, for a
statement of certain details or particulars which would enable the defendant more
readily to prepare and file a responsive pleading.").
26 See Smith, supra note 13, at 917.
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In 1957, the Supreme Court spoke on Rule 8 in Conley. To
understand the context of Twombly, this Part proceeds to describe
Conley as well as two of its more recent progeny-Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit2 7 and Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A. 28 It will then review the Twombly case as well as another
pleading-related case decided during the 2006-2007 Supreme Court
Term, Erickson v. Pardus.29 Finally, it provides a snapshot of select aca-
demic and practical articles in the legal literature in the wake of the
Twombly decision.
A. Conley and Its Progeny
Conley involved a case brought under the Railway Labor Act 30 by
African American employees against their local railway union. 31 The
plaintiffs alleged that the railroad had "abolished" theirjobs, enabling
the railroad to replace them with Caucasians. 32 The crux of the com-
plaint against the union, the designated bargaining agent under the
Railway Act, was that it had done nothing to protect them from the
discriminatory conduct of the railroad and that the union had thus
failed in its duty to represent African American employees. 33
The defendants moved to dismiss on a number of grounds,
including that the complaint had "failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be given."'3 4 The Supreme Court rejected this claim in a
single paragraph. The Court adopted the "accepted rule" that a
"complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless
it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. '3 5 The Court
also explicitly rejected the claim that "specific facts" were needed "to
support... general allegations"; all that was needed, according to the
Court, was that "fair notice" be given to the defendants. 36
In arriving at this "accepted rule," the Supreme Court cited three
court of appeals decisions that had articulated the requirements of
Rule 8. The earliest case cited by the Court, Leimer v. State Mutual Life
27 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
28 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
29 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007).
30 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (2000).
31 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 127 S.
Ct. 1955 (2007).
32 Id. at 43.
33 See id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 45-46.
36 Id. at 47-48.
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Assurance Co.,3 7 involved a plaintiff suing an insurance company for
recovery of benefits following the death of her husband.3 8 The Eighth
Circuit found that the district court had "misconceived" the purpose
of a motion to dismiss by focusing on whether the "plaintiff had a
meritorious claim upon which [he] was entitled to prevail."3 9 Instead,
the court found that the correct question was "whether the . . . com-
plaint, construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and with
all doubt resolved in favor of its sufficiency, stated a claim upon which
relief could be granted."40 Rule 8, according to the Eighth Circuit,
required only "simpl[e] and informal[]" pleading with "few factual
averments. "41
The Conley Court also cited Continental Collieries, Inc. v. Shober.
42
The district court had dismissed a breach of contract complaint on
two grounds. First, the court chose to give a greater weight to certain
averments and on the basis of those averments found that the statute
of frauds had not been satisfied.4 3 Second, the court found that cer-
tain necessary facts had not been averred. 44 The Third Circuit
reversed. 45 Finding that under the Federal Rules "[t] echnicalities are
no longer of their former importance," the court stated that Rule 8
only required "a short statement which fairly gives notice of the nature
of the claim." 46 Under this standard, the complaint was found to be
sufficient as it was not clear "to a certainty from the complaint" that
the plaintiff was not "entitled to relief under any state of facts which
could be proved."
47
Finally, the Conley Court cited the Second Circuit's decision in
Dioguardi v. Durning48-a decision written by Judge Clark, the drafter
of the Federal Rules. The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, sought to
recover damages from the Collector of Customs for the loss of his
property.49 The key assertions in the complaint stated that the plain-
tiffs "'medicinal extracts' were given to the Springdale Distilling
Company 'with [his] betting ... price of $110: and not their price of
37 108 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1940).
38 See id. at 304.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 305.
42 130 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1942).
43 See id. at 633.
44 See id.
45 See id.
46 Id. at 635.
47 Id.
48 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
49 See id. at 774-75.
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$120' and 'It isnt [sic] so easy to do away with two cases with 37 bottles
of one quart. Being protected, they can take this chance.'"50 Judge
Clark sustained the complaint and found that "however inartistically
they may be stated, the plaintiff has disclosed his claims." 5' The
Supreme Court read and accepted the liberal pleading standard these
three appellate decisions established.
The Conley Court understood that a liberal pleading standard
would create a risk of unmeritous claims taking up valuable judicial
resources. However, the Court ultimately concluded that this risk
could be amply addressed by other pretrial procedures. Specifically,
the Court stated that such "simplified 'notice pleading"' was made
possible by "liberal opportunit[ies] for discovery and the other pre-
trial procedures. '52 Those provisions, and not the Rule 8 require-
ments, were to weed out unmeritorious claims. The pleadings were
merely "to facilitate a proper decision" and not to serve as a trap for
lawyers where one misstep could prove decisive. 53 The Conley deci-
sion, and the circuit decisions cited by the Court, established a liberal
pleading standard for the federal courts and a correspondingly strict
standard for Rule 12(b) (6) motions.
In two more recent opinions, a unanimous Supreme Court reaf-
firmed this simple, liberal pleading standard by rejecting separate
attempts by lower courts to impose heightened pleading standards. In
Leatherman, landowners sought to impose liability on Tarrant County,
Texas, for alleged forcible entries by its law enforcement officers in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.54 The district court and the Fifth
Circuit dismissed on the grounds that the plaintiffs had failed to meet
the "heightened pleading standard" the Fifth Circuit required for civil
rights actions brought against municipalities. 55
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and found that it
was "impossible to square the 'heightened pleading standard' . . . with
the liberal system of 'notice pleading' set up by the Federal Rules.
'56
50 Id. at 775 (quoting plaintiff's amended complaint).
51 Id.
52 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
53 See id. at 48.
54 Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 165 (1993).
55 Id. The heightened standard was justified on two grounds. The first justifica-
tion was based on the risk of municipal functions being disrupted by time-consuming
litigation. See id. at 166-67. The second justification was the belief that the Federal
Rules mandated a varying degree of factual specificity based on the complexity of civil
rights actions. See id.
56 Id. at 168.
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The Court found two structural elements of the Federal Rules persua-
sive. First, it was acknowledged that Rule 9(b) imposed a requirement
of particularity pleading in specific circumstances and, in the words of
the Court, "expressio unius est exclusio alteius"-the express mention of
one thing excludes others. 57 Additionally, the Court acknowledged
that had the Rules been drafted later in the twentieth century, policy
considerations might have led to different Rules 8 and 9.58 The Court
concluded, however, that such policy considerations would have to be
effected through amendment of the Rules, not through judicial inter-
pretation. 59 Though addressing only the specific question of pleading
in municipality civil rights cases, 60 the Court had firmly stated that
policy considerations would not trump the liberal standard created by
the Federal Rules.
In Swierkiewicz, a former employee brought a lawsuit under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196461 and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act6 9 against his employer. 63 The plaintiff, a fifty-three-
year-old Hungarian man, alleged that he had been demoted by his
employer, a predominantly French corporation, and replaced with a
younger, French native. 64 The district court and court of appeals dis-
missed the complaint on the ground that the petitioner had failed to
plead a prima facie case of discrimination. 65 This standard required
57 Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) provides: "In all averments of fraud or
mistake, the circumstances ... shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowl-
edge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally." FED. R.
Civ. P. 9(b).
58 Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
59 Id.
60 Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist explicitly stated that the deci-
sion did not extend to the question of whether heightened pleading could be
required in civil rights actions brought against individual government officials. See id.
at 166-67. The Ninth Circuit, Fifth Circuit, and Eleventh Circuit have all maintained
a heightened pleading standard for civil rights actions against individual government
officials (where qualified immunity is able to be asserted). See, e.g., Epps v. Watson,
492 F.3d 1240, 1242-43 (1lth Cir. 2007); Nunez v. Simms, 341 F.3d 385, 388 (5th Cir.
2003); Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 14 F.3d 457, 460 (9th Cir. 1994).
61 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007).
62 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-624 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).
63 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508-10 (2002).
64 See id.
65 The prima facie case (what lower courts held had to be alleged) is (1) mem-
bership in a protected group; (2) qualification for the job in question; (3) an adverse
employment action; and (4) circumstances that support an inference of discrimina-
tion. See id. at 510.
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more than simply giving the adversary "fair notice" of the claim and
required the plaintiff to advance the factual basis of the claim.
66
The Supreme Court reversed. Drawing a distinction between evi-
dentiary standards and pleading requirements, the Court held that a
pleader could have the burden of presenting evidence on an element
at trial without having to allege it in the pleading.67 The Court also
reaffirmed Conley's reliance on flexible discovery provisions, other
pretrial provisions, and summary judgment to bring "'the gravamen
of the dispute . . . frankly into the open for the inspection of the
court.' "68
As these precedents show, the Supreme Court throughout the lat-
ter half of the twentieth century largely embraced a liberal pleading
standard and allowed a case to proceed so long as the adversary had
"fair notice" of the claim. Policy considerations and concerns regard-
ing unmeritorious claims were, under this regime, properly addressed
at the discovery and summary judgment stage.
B. Twombly's Interpretation
The Supreme Court replaced the oft-cited Conley language in
Twombly. Twombly involved allegations brought on behalf of a putative
class of telephone customers against Incumbent Local Exchange Car-
riers (ILECs)-telecommunication companies that were given
monopolies over regional telephone service but were excluded from
long distance service. 69 The Telecommunications Act of 199670 elimi-
nated these monopolies and imposed "'a host of duties intended to
facilitate market entry.'" 71 The Act required the ILECs to share their
networks with competitors (known as CLECs-Competitive Local
Exchange Carriers) by giving CLECs the option to: (1) purchase local
telephone services at wholesale rates for resale to end users; (2) lease
elements of the ILEC's network on an "unbundled basis"; or (3) inter-
connect its own facilities with the ILEC's network.
72
66 Id.
67 See id. at 511-12.
68 Id. at 512-13 (quoting 5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1202, at 76 (2d ed. 1990)).
69 See Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1961 (2007).
70 Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
47 U.S.C.).
71 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1961 (quoting AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S.
366, 371 (1999)).
72 See id. (citing Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,
540 U.S. 398, 402 (2004); Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 371).
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The complaint alleged that the ILECs had conspired to restrain
trade and inflate local telephone charges in violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act. 73 Specifically, it was alleged that the ILECs, based
on a "compelling common motivatio [n] to thwart the CLECs' compet-
itive efforts," chose to "engag[e] in parallel conduct" in their service
areas in order to inhibit the growth of CLECs.74 Additionally, the
complaint alleged that the ILECs agreed to refrain from competing
against each other.75 The complaint stated that these agreements
could be inferred from the ILECs' failure meaningfully to pursue
attractive business opportunities in markets where they possessed
"'substantial competitive advantages"' and from a statement of the
CEO of one ILEC that competing in an area formerly within a com-
petitor's monopoly "'might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but
that doesn't make it right."'
' 76
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to "address the proper
standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of
parallel conduct. ' 77 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Souter, held
that Rule 8(a), while requiring only a short and plain statement that
gives notice to the defendant, also requires that the factual allegations
"be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. ' 78 In
"applying [this] general standard[] to a § 1 claim" the Court held that
complaints must contain enough factual matter to establish "plausible
grounds" for relief, leading to "a reasonable expectation that discov-
ery [would] reveal evidence of illegal agreement."79 The Court, turn-
ing to the complaint, found it deficient-it alleged only parallel
conduct, allegations insufficient to establish a conspiracy.80 This plau-
sibility requirement only requires that the complaint, taken as true,
establish plausible grounds for relief-it is ultimately irrelevant if "it
73 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
74 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1962 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in
original) (quoting the complaint). Among the specific conduct alleged was that the
ILECs "ma[de] unfair agreements with the CLECs ... , provid[ed] inferior connec-
tions to the networks, overcharg[ed], and bill[ed] in ways designed to sabotage the
CLECs' relations with their own customers." Id. (citing the complaint).
75 See id.
76 Id. (quoting the complaint).
77 Id. at 1963.
78 Id. at 1965 (citing 5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
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strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable" 81 or
"'that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.'- 82
Significantly, the Court justified this "plausibility requirement" by
breaking in two ways with earlier pleading precedents. First, the
Court found policy considerations persuasive. Recognizing that "pro-
ceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive," the Court found that
"a district court must retain the power to insist upon some specificity
in pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy
to proceed. 83 Second, the Court decided that other procedural tools
could not adequately address such policy concerns, finding in fact that
it "has been a common lament that the success of judicial supervision
in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side. '84 Addi-
tionally, it was "self-evident that the problem of discovery abuse can-
not be solved by 'careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary
judgment stage."' 85 A half century of practical experience had appar-
ently shaken the Supreme Court's confidence in "liberal oppor-
tunit[ies] for discovery and the other pretrial procedures.
86
The Court's articulated plausibility language was expressly
directed at what Rule 8 required of complaints brought under the
Sherman Act. The Court, however, appeared to speak more broadly
when discussing the 12(b) (6) standard articulated in Conley. The
Court cited four court of appeals decisions and two law review articles
that critically explored Conley's "no set of facts" language before
expressly rejecting a "focused and literal reading of Conley's" lan-
guage. 87 In effect, the Court found that the federal judiciary had mis-
applied Conley for fifty years. The Court found the language as having
81 Id. (emphasis added).
82 Id. (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
83 Id. at 1967 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Coun-
cil of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528 n.17 (1983)).
84 Id. (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638
(1989)).
85 Id. (quoting id. at 1975 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
86 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957), abrogated by Twombly, 127 S. Ct.
1955.
87 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1968 (citing Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobile Oil Co., 886
F.2d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 1989); McGregor v. Indus. Excess Landfill, Inc., 856 F.2d 39,
32-43 (6th Cir. 1988); Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th
Cir. 1984); O'Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 n.3 (1st Cir. 1976); Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665 (1998); Richard L.
Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 433 (1986)).
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"earned its retirement" and that it was "best forgotten as an incom-
plete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard."
88
The "no set of facts" language articulated in Conley and as applied
by the federal judiciary would have seemingly allowed a complaint to
survive a 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss even if the complaint articulated
less than "plausible" grounds for relief. All that was required, at least
from a literal reading of the language, was that the pleader raise the
possibility of relief and give fair notice to the defendant. Arguably,
shifting away from 12(b) (6)'s language that requires mere possibility
towards language that requires plausibility implies that the pleading
bar has been raised. However, Twombly and a subsequent Supreme
Court case challenge this implication and suggest that Twombly may be
a simple linguistic reformulation of the old standard. First, the
Twombly Court expressly disclaimed that they were requiring a height-
ened pleading standard. 9 The Court stated they had not affirmed
the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the facts were not
particularized, but rather because it "failed in toto to render plaintiffs'
entitlement to relief plausible."90
Second, a week after Twombly, the Supreme Court issued a deci-
sion in Erickson. The case involved a prisoner proceeding pro se
against prison officials alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. '1 The prisoner, Erick-
son, was diagnosed with hepatitis C and was receiving treatment from
the Colorado Department of Corrections.9 2 Prison officials suspected
that Erickson was misappropriating the treatment syringes for drug
use; as a result, Erickson was cut off from treatment.9 3 The complaint
alleged that this removal of treatment endangered his life. 94 The
court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint on the
grounds that it contained only "conclusory allegations to the effect
that he has suffered a cognizable independent harm."
9 5
88 Id. at 1969. The Court viewed the Conley Court not as setting the minimum
pleading standard, but rather as "describ[ing] the breadth of opportunity to prove
what an adequate complaint claims." Id. Once a claim was adequately stated, the
pleader could support the claim by "showing any set of facts consistent with the allega-
tions in the complaint." Id.
89 See id. at 1973 n.14.
90 Id.




95 Id. at 2199 (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 198 F. App'x 694, 698 (10th Cir.
2006)).
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The Supreme Court reversed. The Court, citing Twombly, again
stated that Rule 8 does not require the pleading of specific facts and
that the statement need only give "the defendant fair notice of what
the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."9 6 The Court
found that the petitioner's allegation that the removal of treatment
was endangering his life was sufficient to satisfy Rule 8(a) (2). 9 7 The
Tenth Circuit's "departure from the liberal pleading standards set
forth by Rule 8(a) (2)" was "even more pronounced ... because peti-
tioner . . .proceed[ed] without counsel.
98
The Supreme Court has sent two distinct messages. First, the
Court rejected the well-established language used for evaluating the
sufficiency of a complaint. After Twombly, complaints apparently must
establish grounds for relief that are plausible, not only possible, to sur-
vive a 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss. At the same time, however, in both
Twombly and Erickson, the Court rejected any heightened pleading
standard and reaffirmed the "liberal pleading standard" under Rule
8(a) (2).
C. The Response in the Literature
In analyzing Twombly and Erickson, the commentator response to
the decision has run the gamut.99 On one end, a number of writers
have concluded that Twombly is best understood as a decision
extending only to pleading in antitrust contexts. At the other end,
writers believe that Twombly signals a revolutionary overhaul of the
entire concept of notice pleading. This subpart illustrates how com-
mentators, operating without empirical data, have reached fundamen-
tally different conclusions regarding Twombly's effect and significance.
On one point the writers appear to be in agreement- Twombly
means an increase in the litigation over pleadings before federal dis-
trict courts. Many believe that "one thing is certain after Twombly,"
namely that defendants will be encouraged to test the meaning and
limits of the decision by filing motions to dismiss. 100 Writers outside
of the academic context have also subscribed to this view, remarking
96 Id. at 2200 (quoting Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007)).
97 See id.
98 Id.
99 A third decision was also mentioned by some commentators- Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007). This case, decided one month
after Twombly, involved the pleading standard for cases brought under § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See id. at 2505.
100 Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L.
REv. IN BRIEF 135, 142 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/07/
09/dodson.pdf.
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that Twombly is "sparking a wave of paperwork, as defense lawyers file
new motions to dismiss in a wide swath of lawsuits."101
On the more fundamental question-what influence Twombly will
have on how courts evaluate the sufficiency of pleadings-there is
division. While admitting that the Twombly decision was "poorly
crafted and include [d] an abundance of contradictory dicta" capable
of multiple interpretations,10 2 Professor Ides concludes that Twombly
is subject to a "better" reading. Twombly, in his view, is better under-
stood as not having changed the law on pleading, but as simply apply-
ing "long-accepted pleading standards to a unique body of law under
which the ... complaint failed to include ... facts or plausible infer-
ences supportive of a material element of the claim." 103 Professor
Ides believes that any disagreement with the decision properly rests
not with any issue relating to pleading, but rather with the substantive
requirements of the Sherman Act.
10 4
Professor Ides provides a number of rationales for why a "height-
ened pleading" reading of Twombly should be rejected. First, the
Court in Twombly explicitly states it is not imposing a heightened stan-
dard.10 5 Second, the decision was not based on any supposed insuffi-
ciency of the plaintiffs' allegations of a conspiracy, but rather their
staking their claim of conspiratorial agreement solely on parallel con-
duct-an inadequate allegation under section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 10 6 Third, Professor Ides finds that any reading of Twombly that
imposes a heightened pleading requirement could be sustained only
if the Court's holding in Swierkiewicz had been overruled-a conclu-
sion Professor Ides believes should not be reached lightly in the
101 Wendy N. Davis, Just the Facts, but More of Them, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2007, at 16, 18;
see a/soJohn H. Bogart, The Supreme Court Decision in Twombly: A New Federal Pleading
Standard?, UTAH B.J., Sept.-Oct. 2007, at 20, 22 ("There will be, and already are, a
flurry of motions requesting district courts to give closer scrutiny to Section 1
complaints.").
102 Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice,
243 F.R.D. 604, 606 (2007).
103 Id. at 635-36. Specifically, Professor Ides believes that the Supreme Court was
applying "simplified pleading" within the context of a section 1 Sherman Act claim.
See id. at 634-35. The Court found, appropriately according to Professor Ides, that
the complaint had failed to independently allege an actual agreement; it only alleged
parallel conduct-allegations which do not state a claim for a section 1 Sherman Act
violation. See id. at 635.
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absence of an express overruling.'0 7 Finally, he believes that Erickson,
by upholding a complaint for simply giving fair notice and rejecting
specific fact pleading, sends both explicit and implicit messages that
Twombly should not be read as imposing a heightened pleading
standard. 108
Other commentators believe that Twombly will have an effect, but
one likely confined to antitrust litigation. 0 9 From this view, attempt-
ing to read in Twombly a universally applicable heightened pleading
standard conflicts with the major reasoning of the decision. The
Court found both the excessive costs of antitrust discovery and the
difficulty confronting district courts when trying to control antitrust
litigation to be compelling. 110 To the extent that these concerns do
not apply to every type of case or substantive area of the law, Twombly's
reasoning may not be able to be easily applied beyond the antitrust
field."1 Finally, as with Professor Ides, these commentators believe
that Erickson may serve as an affirmation of traditional pleading stan-
dards more broadly. 112
Other writers, however, do not believe that the Twombly decision
should be so narrowly construed. Wendy Davis, writing for the Ameri-
can Bar Association Journal, states that the "decision effectively
changed the standard for pleadings in civil lawsuits" and remarks that
lower courts have cited the case in a vast array of cases outside the
antitrust field. 113 She concludes that plaintiffs' lawyers will, at mini-
mum, "have to include more information in their pleadings if they
want to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)6." 14 Ms. Davis
does not believe the decision itself offers any rigid test that compels
this result. Rather, she believes this change has been effected by
granting increased discretion to district court judges-judges who are
under competing pressures to advance worthwhile cases to discovery
but also to clear their busy calendars of cases that "don't appear likely
to go anywhere."'
15
Professor Dodson is more direct. He firmly believes that the best
reading of Twombly is one that holds that notice pleading is dead for
107 See id.
108 See id. at 636-39.
109 See, e.g., Bogart, supra note 101, at 22.
110 See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
111 See Bogart, supra note 101, at 22.
112 See, e.g., id.
113 Davis, supra note 101, at 16. The finding that Twombly has been cited widely
outside of the antitrust context was amply supported by my study. See infra Part III.
114 Davis, supra note 101, at 16.
115 Id. at 18 (paraphrasing Columbia Law School Professor Michael Doff).
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"all cases and causes of action." 116 While he acknowledges the impor-
tance the Twombly majority placed on the expense of antitrust discov-
ery, in his view, the repudiation of the Conley "no set of facts standard"
is "not cabined by the costs and expenses that might accrue."'
' 17
Because the decision revoked a generally applied standard, the effects
of the decision must sweep beyond the factual circumstances underly-
ing the case. Nor does Professor Dodson believe that Erickson some-
how rescues notice pleading. According to him, Erickson fails to
trump Twombly for two reasons. First, Erickson is a case in which the
plaintiff was proceeding pro se. The Court acknowledged in Erickson
that pro se complaints are subject to a pleading standard that is "more
liberal"-consequently, the two decisions were so fundamentally dif-
ferent that their apparent discrepancy is "perfectly consistent."1 18 Sec-
ond, Erickson's rejection of the need to plead "specific facts" is the
same as the rejection of the necessity of "specific facts" in Twombly-
both serve merely as statements that the complaints were not subject
to "particularized pleading" under Rule 9. In this view, Twombly is not
significant for requiring specific facts to be pled, but rather for alter-
ing the definition of what constitutes sufficient facts under Rule 8.119
Professor Spencer agrees that Twombly has brought a new plead-
ing standard. He articulates Twombly's significance as bringing a
"new, more stringent pleading standard."' 20 The critical element
behind this shift is a change in how the Court has treated inferences
deriving from a complaint. Under Conley, as long as the complaint
contained factual allegations that were consistent with liability it
"passed muster because courts were required to draw any permissible
inference in the plaintiffs favor."' 21 According to Professor Spencer,
the key in Twombly's plausibility pleading standard is that it deprives
plaintiffs of these beneficial inferences. 122 Professor Spencer also
agrees with Professor Dodson on the role of Erickson in evaluating
Twombly. He refers to Erickson as a "brief homage" to notice pleading
that "ring[s] hollow" due to the pro se status of the plaintiff, the fact
that the complaint was subject to less stringent scrutiny, and the real-
116 Dodson, supra note 100, at 138.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 140.
119 See id.
120 A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading 16 (Wash. & Lee Pub. Legal Studies
Research Series, Paper No. 2007-17, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1003874.
121 Id.
122 See id. at 16-17.
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ity that the issues involved in the case were substantively "clear-cut."1 23
Twombly is, therefore, best understood as being left undiluted by the
opinion in Erickson.
The broadest view of Twombly ascribes to the decision constitu-
tional implications. Professor Suja Thomas asserts that Twombly has
altered "significantly" the pleading requirements in such a way that
courts can more easily dismiss complaints. Specifically, she believes
that the motion to dismiss is now qualitatively similar to the summary
judgment standard.124 Professor Thomas believes, however, the
importance of the decision goes much farther. She believes that the
motion to dismiss is now an unconstitutional device, one that violates
the Seventh Amendment.125 In her view, Twombly now allows a court
to "assess critically the facts alleged by the plaintiff, including deter-
mining the inferences that favor the defendant" and thus violates the
right to a trial by jury. 126 Along similar grounds, she claims that the
motion to dismiss is no longer comparable to the common law demur-
rer, adding to its constitutional infirmity.
27
Professor Ides best summed up the state of the academic
response to Twombly when he stated, correctly, that "reasonable and
intelligent minds can and will arrive at different interpretations."
1 28
However, even if it were accepted that one view was the "correct" read-
ing of Twombly, the academic debate would be able to tell a practicing
attorney only how district courts should apply the new decision. It
would not answer the important question of how the lower courts
actually have applied the decision. This empirical study seeks to
address this important question.
II. METHODOLOGY
The question behind this study is simple: have the federal district
courts applying Twombly required more from pleadings than they did
prior to the decision? The vehicle for analyzing the effect of the deci-
123 Id. at 24.
124 See Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN.
L. REV. (manuscript at 4, 7) (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1010062.
125 See id. (manuscript at 25-27). The Seventh Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides: "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by
a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than accord-
ing to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
126 Thomas, supra note 124 (manuscript at 27).
127 See id.
128 Ides, supra note 102, at 606.
1828 [VOL. 83:4
2008] MUCH ADO ABOUT TWOMBLY 1829
sion is the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 129 Three considerations moti-
vate this choice. First, the 12(b) (6) motion is used to test the legal
sufficiency of a claim. Under 12 (b) (6), a court takes the allegations in
the complaint as true, and simply asks whether the allegations state a
valid claim under the law. °30 One would expect that if the pleading
standard was altered to require additional facts, a certain set of claims
that would have survived a 12(b) (6) motion before this alteration
would subsequently be dismissed under the more stringent standard.
Second, it was in affirming a grant of a 12(b) (6) motion that the
Twombly Court made its most sweeping pronouncements regarding
Rule 8.'13 Finally, the 12(b) (6) motion lends itself to empirical analy-
sis as it has a finite set of possible outcomes: for any given 12(b) (6)
motion that a court rules on, the motion must either be granted,
denied, or granted-in-part/denied-in-part.13 2 This study is thus built
around an analysis of the respective granted, denied, or "mixed" rates
under both Conley and Twombly.
The study is centered around federal district court cases retrieved
from the commercial database server Westlaw. 133 This study is not
interested in establishing the absolute rates of dismissal in federal dis-
trict courts; it is a comparison of the relative 12(b) (6) dismissal rates
between pre-Twombly and post-Twombly reported district court cases.
While relative dismissal rates based on reported cases may not per-
fectly correspond with the relative dismissal rates in all federal district
court cases, 1 3 4 the fact that any "reported case bias" is equally present
in both the pre- and post- Twombly case set allows for a meaningful
comparison and analysis of any change. Additionally, no sampling was
129 Rule 12(c) motions forjudgment on the pleadings were also included because
of their almost identical nature to 12(b) (6) motions. See infra note 159.
130 See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 13, § 5.22, at 313.
131 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
132 The 12(b) (6) motions that have a "mixed" outcome are the result of the preva-
lence of multiple claims for relief brought in a single complaint. See, e.g., Ritter v. City
ofJacksonville, No. 3:07-cv-506-J-16HTS, 2007 WL 2298347, at *2-3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 7,
2007) (involving a 12(b) (6) motion against a complaint that had a tort-based exces-
sive force and negligent hiring claim as well as a claim brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; the court dismissed the tort-based claim but refused to dismiss the § 1983
claim).
133 All cases in this study were obtained via the Westlaw federal district court
database (DCT).
134 See, e.g., Douglas D. McFarland, Drop the Shoe: A Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 68
Mo. L. REv. 753, 777 n.113 (2003) ("IT]hose statistics that exist count only reported
cases. These numbers severely underreport the number of personal jurisdiction chal-
lenges because the heavy lifting on motions to dismiss for want of personal jurisdic-
tion occurs in unreported trial court decisions.").
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done to arrive at the set of cases; any cases that met the substantive
standards articulated below were included in the study.
It was also important to decide upon the time frame of the case
set. This was straightforward for the experimental group (i.e., those
district court cases that cite Twombly in ruling on a 12(b) (6) motion)
as Twombly was handed down on May 14, 2007. Every case that had
cited Twombly in the context of a 12(b) (6) motion from June 2007 to
December 2007 (which, at the time of the study, represented all such
reported citations of Twombly) were included and divided into two
groups: June through September 2007 ("Summer 2007") and October
through December 2007 ("Winter 2007").135 The control group
(those cases that cite Conley in the context of a 12(b) (6) motion)
required a more substantive decision with regard to the time frame.
Conley was handed down in 1957-an analysis of every reported case
that cited Conley in a 12(b) (6) context would be beyond the scope of
this study. Four sets of 12(b) (6) Conley cites were chosen as a control:
June through September 2006 ("Summer 2006"), October through
December 2006 ("Winter 2006"), February through May 2007 (the
four months immediately prior to Twombly, "Spring 2007"), and June
through September 2007136 ("Summer 2007"). These time frames
were selected as they allowed for an examination of any differences in
how courts had applied Rule 12(b) (6) both immediately prior to and
one year before the Twombly decision.
The fact that this study is analyzing only the immediate impact
(the first seventh months) of Twombly is both a curse and a benefit. It
is a curse because it is possible that the courts have not had sufficient
time to analyze and decide what Twombly should actually mean. Addi-
tionally, it may be that the Twombly decision has not fully trickled
down to the district courts; the hundreds of cases that cite Conley's
overruled language without mentioning that it is no longer good law
would suggest this may be the case. With that said, the short time
135 These groups did not include the limited number of cases that cited Twombly
in May.
136 There were numerous court opinions that cited Conley without mentioning
Twombly or the fact that Conley's "no set of facts" language had been overruled. See,
e.g., MSD Energy, Inc. v. Gognat, 507 F. Supp. 2d 764 (W.D. Ky. 2007) ("Denial of the
[12(b) (6)] motion is proper 'unless it can be established beyond a doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief.'" (quoting Achterhof v. Selvaggio, 886 F.2d 826, 831 (6th Cir. 1989))). For this
fourth control, I crafted the Westlaw search in such a way as to only include those
decisions that were apparently oblivious to the overturning of the Conley standard. I
was primarily interested in being able to compare what the district courts that applied
Twombly did with 12(b) (6) motions to what district courts that applied the defunct
Conley standard at the same time did with the same type of motions.
1830 [VOL. 83:4
MUCH ADO ABOUT TWOMBLY
frame has two major advantages. First, based on those cases in the set
that had docket information on Westlaw, the vast majority of cases in
this study involved a complaint that was filed before the Twombly deci-
sion. 137 This means that the lawyers drafted these complaints with the
previous Conley standard in mind. Similarly, the majority of the
12(b) (6) motions in the study set were brought before Twombly.
Thus, if the commentators are correct and Twombly means that more
motions to dismiss will be filed, 13 8 any confounding effects should be
kept to a minimum, especially in comparing the control group results
to the Summer 2007 Twombly results. The short time frame helps
ensure, in short, that the study is examining whether there is any dif-
ference in the 12(b) (6) granted rate by courts applying Twombly to
complaints and 12(b) (6) motions that were conceived and drafted
with the Conley standard in mind.
Having made these preliminary decisions, it became necessary to
eliminate three classes of cases. Most generally, it was necessary to
eliminate those cases where the complaint was evaluated under Fed-
eral Rule 9(b) rather than Rule 8. Federal Rule 9(b) requires that
averments of fraud or mistake be stated "with particularity."
13 9
Twombly dealt with the requirements of pleading under Rule 8.
Including cases based on fraud or mistake in the set of cases would
potentially hide or distort any effect Twombly has had on Rule 8
pleadings.
Additionally, there were two more narrow categories of cases
eliminated from the set. First, actions brought under section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act (SEA) of 1934140 were removed. In 1995,
Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA)14 1 seeking to end "abusive practices committed in private
137 Filing date of the complaint was attained through the docket information pos-
sessed by Westlaw. For the Summer 2007 months, every case was filed prior to the
Twombly decision. The months of October and November 2007 began to see the pres-
ence of cases which had been initiated following Twombly. See, e.g., Stanley ex rel. L.B.
v. Bullock County Bd. of Educ., No. 2:07cv681-WHA, 2007 WL 4105149 (M.D. Ala.
Nov. 15, 2007) (complaint filed July 26, 2007).
138 See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
139 FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
140 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000) ("It shall be unlawful for any person ... by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange .... (b) To use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the [Securities Exchange Commission] may prescribe . . ").
141 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.).
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securities litigation" which, in Congress' findings, included "the rou-
tine filing of lawsuits against issuers of securities . . . whenever there
[was] a significant change in . . .stock price, without regard to any
underlying culpability... and with only faint hope that the discovery
might lead eventually to some plausible cause of action.' 42 A core
element of this reform was the imposition of a heightened pleading
requirement: First, any plaintiff is required to state "with particularity
all facts on which [the belief that the defendant engaged in deceptive
conduct] is formed."1 43 Second, the plaintiff must also "state with par-
ticularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind."'144 The PSLRA, therefore, imposes
stringent pleading requirements that go beyond those required under
Rule 8. Thus, for the same reason that Rule 9 cases were eliminated,
actions brought under section 10(b) of the SEA were not included in
the case set.
The remaining category of cases removed from the set was cases
where the plaintiff proceeded either in forma pauperis or pro se. Pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, federal courts may authorize commence-
ment of a suit without requiring payment of filing fees, provided the
individual can show the requisite need (termed by the statute as "pro-
ceeding[] in forma pauperis"). 145 As a consequence of proceeding in
forma pauperis, a plaintiffs complaint is "screened" by the district
court. Subsection (e) (2) provides, in part, that the court shall dismiss
the complaint if the court determines that the complaint fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted.14 6 This standard applied by
the courts pursuant to subsection (e) (2) (B) (ii) is the same as the stan-
dard applied by courts pursuant to a 12(b)(6) motion. 147 These
142 H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.
143 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (1) (2000).
144 Id. § 78u-4(b)(2) (emphasis added).
145 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (2000). Interestingly, the statute appears to be
targeted solely at prisoner suits. The text of the section states that "[a] ny court of the
United States may authorize the commencement ... of any suit ... without prepay-
ment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a
state of all assets such prisonerpossesses." Id. (emphasis added). The courts, however,
have not applied this statute literally, choosing instead to apply the apparent congres-
sional intent reflected in the use of the word "person" earlier in the clause. See, e.g.,
Smith v. Cinema 7 Corp., No. C 07-04586 CRB, 2007 WL 3168944, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 29, 2007) (granting a motion to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 in a nonprisoner case).
146 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
147 SeeWolfson v. Carlucci, 232 F. App'x 849, 850 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007) ("We recog-
nize ... that the language of § 1915(e) (2) (B) (ii) regarding the failure to state a legal
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screening actions are not, however, 12(b) (6) motions and were thus
eliminated so as to exclude any confounding effects these screening
effects may have had. A further study may show that Twombly has had
a unique effect on how courts have applied this screening function.
Cases in which the plaintiff proceeded pro se were removed for
similar considerations. It has been routinely held by courts at every
level of the federal judiciary that pro se complaints are to be con-
strued liberally. 148 This liberal standard subjects such complaints to a
"less stringent standard[] than formal pleadings drafted by law-
yers." 149 In order to ensure that the study was examining a uniform
standard, these cases were removed from the set of cases. As with the
in forma pauperis cases, it is possible that a future study will demon-
strate that Twombly (understood in light of Erickson) has had an inde-
pendent impact on how courts approach pro se cases. In a more
general sense, this study was conceived of as an attempt to provide
practicing attorneys with some concrete context regarding Twombly.
In order to best accomplish this goal, it is necessary to limit the focus
of the study to how courts have treated complaints filed by attorneys.
Compiling these various criteria, I ran five Westlaw searches (one
for each control group and the experimental groups) 150 in the federal
district court database that encompassed all cases that: (1) cited either
Conley or Twombly (either by name or by case citation); (2) included
the phrase "failure to state a claim" or "12(b) (6)" within a paragraph
of the Conley or Twombly citation; but that (3) did not have the attor-
ney listed as "pro se"; (4) did not include the phrase "Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act" or its abbreviation PSLRA; and (5) did not
include a mention of Rule 9 (drafted a number of ways, reflecting the
differing ways Rule 9 can be cited) .151 The result of these searches
was to obtain four individual lists of cases, which combined for around
3287 district court cases.
claim tracks with Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) such that review of dismissals under those
two provisions should be the same.").
148 See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007); Kay v. Bemis, 500
F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007); Nedab v. Neal, No. 06-07 Erie, 2007 WL 2407284, at
*2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2007).
149 Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam).
150 These searches were run on September 5, 2007, September 10, 2007, Septem-
ber 14, 2007, October 12, 2007, and January 8, 2008. A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet
listing the name and citation of every case included in this study is on file with author.
151 Utilizing this method of searching carries with it the inevitable side effect of
being overinclusive or underinclusive depending on the parameter. For example,
there undoubtedly are cases that cite Federal Rule 9 not to apply it, but to merely
contrast it with Rule 8. Any overinclusiveness was corrected by removing any case that
does not in fact meet with the above criteria in both the experimental and control sets.
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Having obtained this presumptive set of cases, each case was read
and a variety of information was recorded. Besides the citation of the
case, the following was recorded: the date of the case; the district
court issuing the ruling; the circuit in which the district court sits; a
general description of the causes of action; 152 whether the motion to
dismiss was, considering all causes of action, granted, denied, or
"mixed" (granted-in-part/denied-in-part); and whether the motion to
dismiss was granted, denied, or "mixed" as to each claim category. In
the process of reading through these cases, fifteen percent of the
cases Westlaw provided had to be removed for not meeting the "spirit"
of the search parameters. Cases were removed, for example, for being
decisions on summary judgment motions, 5 3 motions to amend,
15 4
motions for reconsideration, 55 motions to dismiss for lack of subject
matterjurisdiction, 56 or for being cases in which the plaintiff was pro-
ceeding pro se, 157 or where the complaint was predicated on fraud or
mistake (and thus subject to Rule 9).158 Having removed these cases,
a total of 3287 district court cases (1075 Twombly cases and 2212 Conley
152 If the case had more than one cause of action, all were separately defined. The
general categories used were "Antitrust," "Civil Rights" (focusing on 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1983, 1985, Bivens claims, as well as generalized claims brought for "due
process" or "equal protection" violations), "Torts," "Contracts" (including general
business litigation), "Consumer" (primarily encompassing consumer protection laws),
"Federal Other" (covering miscellaneous actions brought under federal statutory
law), and "State Other" (covering miscellaneous actions brought under state statutory
law). This grouping of cases, however, eventually proved largely unworkable. See
infra note 160.
153 See, e.g., Mayne v. Dennis Stubbs Plumbing, Inc., No. RDB 05-774, 2006 WL
1997398, at *5 (D. Md. July 13, 2006) (converting a 12(b) (6) motion into a Rule 56
summary judgment motion).
154 See, e.g., Parra v. Markel Int'l Ins. Co., No. L-06-59, 2007 WL 2363013, at *1
(S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2007) (involving a plaintiff moving for leave to file an amended
complaint).
155 See, e.g., Martinez v. Donna Indep. Sch. Dist., No. M-03-377, 2007 WL 2446814,
at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2007) (denying plaintiffs motion for reconsideration of a
court order dismissing a political association claim).
156 See, e.g., Gilmore v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 2d 649, 653 (D. Minn. 2007)
(involving a motion for judgment on the pleadings properly understood as a motion
to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(1) and thus applying that standard).
157 See, e.g., Brathwaite v. Holman, No. CIV. A. 04-1542(GMS), 2006 WL 1995137,
at *1 (D. Del. July 17, 2006) ("Brathwaite filed this pro se civil rights action .... ).
158 See, e.g., Ferron v. Zoomego, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-751, 2007 WL 1974946, at *3
(S.D. Ohio July 3, 2007) ("[T]he elevated standards of Rule 9(b) will be applied to
Plaintiff's claims ....").
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cases) remained.159 The following results were calculated from these
3287 cases.
III. FINDINGS
The first analysis was to examine the granted, denied, and mixed
rates for the control groups (the cases citing Conley in a 12(b) (6) con-
text, over four separate time frames). The results were calculated for
each separate control group. This allowed for the consistency among
the Conley-citing cases to be evaluated. The results of this analysis are
recorded in Table 1 (total number of cases in parenthesis).
TABLE 1. OVERALL RESULTS FOR CASES CITING CONLEY
1 Denied Granted Mixed
TOTAL (2212) 34.1% (755) 36.8% (813) 29.1% (644)
Summer 2006* (683) 33.5% (229) 37.9% (259) 28.6% (195)
Winter 2006** (439) 33.3% (146) 36.0% (158) 30.8% (135)
Spring 2007*** (769) 35.4% (272) 35.8% (275) 28.9% (222)
Summer 2007 (321) 33.6% (108) 37.7% (121) 28.7% (92)
Note that "Summer" includes the months of June through September
** Note that "Winter" includes the months of October through December
*** Note that "Spring" includes the months of February through May
These results show a great deal of consistency among the control
groups. The denial rate fluctuated within a roughly 2.0% band
(between 35.4% at the high end and 33.3% at the low end). The
granted rate saw fluctuation within a similar, albeit higher, 2.1% band
(between 37.9% on the high end and 35.8% on the low end). Simi-
larly, the "mixed" rate fluctuated within a rough 2.0% band (between
30.8% on the high end and 28.6% on the low end). Based on these
results, it appears that among reported cases, 12(b) (6) motions were
granted at a rate higher (on average by only 2.7%) than they were
denied. Having calculated these results, the critical analysis was to
compare them to the rates for cases that cited Twombly in the 12 (b) (6)
context. These results are shown in Table 2, along with the Conley
results for comparison.
159 It should be noted that there was one subset of cases that, while not technically
a 12(b) (6) motion, I chose to include-12(c) motions for judgment on the pleadings.
While not a 12(b) (6) motion, it applies the 12(b) (6) standard, see Guidry v. Am. Pub.
Life Ins. Co., 412 F.3d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 2007), and unlike other mechanisms that
apply a 12(b) (6)-like standard (such as the in forma pauperis screening standard or
the motion to amend standard), a 12(c) motion is filed at the discretion of the par-
ties. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(c). The only difference between a 12(b) (6) and 12(c) motion
is when it is filed.
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TABLE 2. OVERALL RESULTS FOR CASES CITING TWOMBLY
11 Denied Granted Mxed
TOTAL Twombly (1075) j 32.6% (350) 39.4% (424) 28.0% (301)
Summer 2007 (571) 33.8% (193) 40.6% (232) 25.6% (146)
Winter 2007 (504) 31.2% (157) 38.1% (192) 30.8% (155)
TOTAL Conley (2212) 34.1% (755) 36.8% (813) 29.1% (644)
Summer 2006 (683) 33.5% (229) 37.9% (259) 28.6% (195)
Winter 2006 (439) 33.3% (146) 36.0% (158) 30.8% (135)
Spring 2007 (769) j 35.4% (272) 35.8% (275) 28.9% (222)
Summer 2007 (321) 33.6% (108) 37.7% (121) 28.7% (92)
At first glance, the difference between the total Conley and
Twombly granted rates might not appear significant-under three
points. However, these numbers are almost three points over the aver-
age Conley granted rate and a full one-and-a-half points over the high-
est granted rate under the Conley control groups. These results
indicate that Twombly has had at least a slight impact in how courts
have approached 12(b) (6) motions to dismiss.
My next inquiry was to examine whether the application of
Twombly was uniform across substantive law areas. This analysis
revealed significant results. Analysis as to most of the substantive areas
proved impossible given the extremely small representation those
cases had in the overall set.160 The "civil rights"'1 61 category (the larg-
est and most clearly defined category of cases), however, could be ana-
lyzed meaningfully. The results ofjust the civil rights causes of action
are listed in Table 3.
160 For example, antitrust cases-cases that should be examined in the wake of
Twombl---comprised only 2.3% (seventy-five cases) of my set of cases, making any
meaningful analysis impossible. Additionally, the broad categories employed (such as
"Torts" or "Contracts") proved too broad; as I read farther, it became apparent that
there were causes of action I had not anticipated and had difficulty classifying. Conse-
quently, the lines between these general categories blurred. The civil rights category,
however, remained clearly defined. See infra note 161. This, combined with the fact
that there were ample civil rights cases in the set, allowed for analysis of that category.
161 The civil rights category did not include actions brought under certain statutes
such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, or
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Cases brought under these statutes were
categorized as "Federal Other." The "Civil Rights" label applied to claims brought
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983 (and § 1983's counterpart against federal offi-
cials-so-called Bivens actions), and 1985 as well as generalized claims of due process
or equal protection violations.
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TABLE 3. OVERALL RESULTS FOR CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS
11 Denied Granted Mixed
TOTAL Twombly (278)1 16.9% (47) 52.9% (147) 30.2% (84)
Summer 2007 (149) 19.5% (29) 52.3% (78) 28.2% (42)
Winter 2007 (129) 14.0% (18) 53.5% (69) 32.6% (42)
TOTAL Conley (686) 23.6% (162) 41.7% (286) 34.7% (238)
Summer 2006 (212) 25.9% (55) 42.0% (89) 32.1% (68)
Winter 2006 (139) 23.0% (32) 41.7% (58) 35.3% (49)
Spring 2007 (220) 22.3% (49) 40.5% (89) 37.3% (82)
Summer 2007 (115) 22.6% (26) 43.5% (50) 33.9% (39)
As this table demonstrates, there was a pronounced change in the
granted and denial rates of 12(b) (6) motions between the Conley cases
and the Twombly cases. While the rates for the Conley cases remained
fairly consistent between control groups, the granted rate in the
Twombly group jumped by over eleven points while the denial rate fell
by almost seven points. In light of this finding, the "overall" numbers
in Table 2 were recalculated by removing all civil rights causes of
action from each group of cases. If a given case was entirely a civil
rights action, the case was subsequently removed from the set. If a
case contained multiple causes of action, only some of which were
civil rights-based, the "granted," "denied," or "mixed" label was
recomputed without considering the civil rights claim. The results
obtained by this recalculation are found in Table 4.
TABLE 4. OVERALL RESULTS FOR NON-CIVIl. RIGHTS CLAIMS
Denied IF Granted Mixed
TOTAL Twombly (906) 37.9% (343) 374% (339) 24.7% (224)
Summer 2007 (471) 39.9% (188) 38.0% (179) 22.1% (104)
Winter 2007 (435) 35.6% (155) 36.8% (160) 27.6% (120)
TOTAL Conley (1787) 38.7% (692) 36.9% (659) 24.4% (436)
Summer 2006 (554) 37.2% (206) 38.6% (214) 24.2% (134)
Winter 2006 (359) 38.7% (139) 36.2% (130) 25.1% (90)
Spring 2007 (628) 40.0% (251) 35.8% (225) 24.2% (152)
Summer 2007 (246) 39.0% (96) 36.6% (90) 24.4% (60)
The results are striking. By removing the civil rights causes of action
from the set completely, the total difference between the granted rate
for the Conley control groups and the Twombly experimental groups is,
on average, half a point.
Having apparently found an area of substantive law where
Twombly was effecting change, I sought to discover whether the
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change was statistically significant. This was accomplished by coding
all the variables into SPSS and running regression analysis on the
data.1 62 The results of this regression analysis confirmed what the per-
centages suggested: civil rights cases that cited Twombly served to
explain the change in the motion to dismiss granted rate. The regres-
sion analysis showed that the Twombly variable and the civil rights vari-
able, taken alone, could not explain the granted rate in a statistically
significant way. When the variables were combined into a single varia-
ble, comprising only the Twombly civil rights cases, the relationship
between this variable and the granted rate did serve to explain the
results-a Twombly civil rights action was 39.6% more likely to be dis-
missed than a random case in the set. This result was statistically sig-
nificant to the 0.05 level.
IV. EXPLAINING THE RESULTS
It would appear that those commentators who believe that
Twombly requires a uniform heightened pleading requirement are
incorrect. The results suggest, at this early date, that Twombly has not
.affected how courts have adjudicated the sufficiency of complaints in
a majority of substantive legal areas. The question remains: why has
Twombly's impact been focused on civil rights cases? This Part puts
forward three hypotheses: (1) Twombly's effects are being hidden by
the realities of pleading practice; (2) district courts are refusing to
alter their longstanding practice in the absence of a more unequivocal
statement by the Supreme Court; or (3) the practice of the lower
courts in relation to 12(b) (6) motions changed well before the
Twombly decision.
A. Hypothesis One: Twombly's Hidden Effects
The first possible explanation is that Twombly has, in fact,
imposed a more stringent review of pleadings across the board, but
that this fact is hidden from the above study because of the pleading
realities. Rule 8 requires that a pleading contain a "short and plain
statement."1 6 3 To reinforce the degree to which a complaint may be
"short and plain," the drafters included a series of sample complaints.
Form 15, the form complaint for conversion provides:
(Statement of jurisdiction.)
162 SPSS database on file with author.
163 FED. R. Crv. P. 8(a).
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On date, at place, the defendant converted to the defendant's own
use property owned by the plaintiff. The property converted con-
sists of describe.
The property is worth $__
Therefore, the plaintiff demands judgment against the defendant
for $-, plus costs.'
64
This form complaint encompasses forty-three words-half the length
of the two quotes that open this Note. This is the essence of notice
pleading-if it gives notice, it is sufficient.
Compare, however, Form 15 to recent complaints involving con-
version claims. The complaint involved in Doll v. Chicago Title Insur-
ance Co. 1 65 is fourteen pages long and comprises close to 3000
words. 166 The complaint in Peskoff v. Faber'67 is over thirty-two pages
long with a 6418 word count.168 It appears that lawyers in practice
have used Rule 8's requirement of a "short and plain" statement as a
"guideline" rather than a mandatory requirement. Complaints in the
federal judiciary are neither short nor plain-in fact it appears that
there is a habitual practice among attorneys to overplead.
Not only are lawyers pleading far beyond the necessities of Rule
8, but judges are well aware of the practice. In American Nurses'Ass'n
v. Illinois,'69 Judge Posner, trying to decipher what the plaintiffs were
"complaining about," remarked that the task "would be easier if the
complaint had been drafted with the brevity that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure envisag[d] .170 Judge Posner also recognized the stra-
tegic considerations motivating the lawyers' tendency to overplead:
[L] awyers, knowing that some judges read a complaint as soon as it
is filed in order to get a sense of the suit, hope by pleading facts to
"educate" . . . the judge with regard to the nature and probable
merits of the case, and also hope to set the stage for an advanta-
geous settlement by showing the defendant what a powerful case
they intend to prove.
1 7 1
In the case before the court of appeals, the twenty page com-
plaint (with a one hundred page appendix) was found to be sufficient
164 Id. FORM 15.
165 517 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (D. Kan. 2007).
166 See First Amended Complaint-Class Action, Doll, 517 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (No.
06-CV-2416-JWL), 2006 WL 4015291.
167 244 F.R.D. 54 (D.D.C. 2007).
168 See Complaint, Peskoff 244 F.R.D. 54 (No. 1:04CV00526), 2004 WL 2683820.
169 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986).
170 Id. at 723.
171 Id. at 723-24.
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and the lower court's dismissal reversed. 172 Thus, while judges seem
to complain about the length and complexity of pleading, 173 they
rarely take action against the excessive complaint.
174
This tradition of overpleading in the pre-Twombly federal court
system could be masking Twombly's true effect. This can be explained
in a simplified hypothetical: assume that Rule 8(a) pre-Twombly
required x. Also assume for the majority of cases, the average com-
plaint pleads x + 50% while for a smaller subset of cases, for a number
of reasons, the average complaint is pled merely at x + 15%. If
Twombly alters the Rule 8(a) standard to now require x + 15%, the
average complaint in most substantive areas would be largely, if not
completely, unaffected. For that small subset of cases however, the
change brought by Twombly would have a dramatic and readily appar-
ent impact.
It is possible that Twombly has raised the pleading bar higher, but
set it at a point in which the change goes unnoticed in most substan-
tive areas. Commentators have argued that a heightened pleading
standard would create a particularly heavy burden on civil rights plain-
tiffs, one that most would be unable to bear. 17 5 An example of the
disproportionate burden a heightened pleading standard could
impose on civil rights cases can be evidenced in failure to train cases
brought pursuant to § 1983. In order to prevail in holding a munici-
pality liable under this section for failing to train its personnel, a
plaintiff must be able to show a deficiency in a city's training program
that is closely related to the injury suffered. 17 6 A heightened pleading
requirement that required concrete examples of the deficient training
program to be provided in the pleading would effectively shut out
those claims at the motion to dismiss stage for a fundamental rea-
son-evidence pertaining to a city's training program would be wholly
within the knowledge of the defendant and inaccessible to the plain-
172 See id. at 724, 730.
173 See Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merch. Servs., Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 776 (7th Cir.
1994) (describing the complaint as "confusing, redundant, and seemingly
interminable").
174 See id. (addressing the merits of the complaint despite the "'egregious viola-
tion of Rule 8(a)'" (quoting Hartz v. Friedman, 919 F.2d 469, 471 (7th Cir. 1990)));
see also THOMAS D. ROWE, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 47 (2004) ("Occasionally courts
grumble about excessively long complaints and threaten to strike them for failing to
comply with the Rule 8(a), but they rarely do so in fact.").
175 See Elaine M. Korb & Richard A. Bales, A Permanent Stop Sign: Why Courts Should
Yield to the Temptation to Impose Heightened Pleading Standards in § 1983 Cases, 41 BRAN-
DEIS L.J. 267, 292 (2002).
176 See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989).
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tiff without discovery.' 7 Civil rights cases may thus fall into the cate-
gory of cases that many commentators believe will be most affected by
Twombly--those where the defendant's state of mind is at play or
where crucial elements of the claim are completely in the knowledge
of the defendant.
178
The quality of the lawyering in civil rights cases could also explain
why more searching review of a complaint would have a dispropor-
tionate impact on civil rights pleading. Civil rights plaintiffs are over-
whelmingly poor.1 79 It follows that such a class of impoverished
litigants would be unable to afford the same caliber of counsel as
more affluent plaintiffs. It is not clear that an attorneys' fee provision
or tort-like contingency fee system would alleviate this problem. First,
civil rights actions tend to be either for no monetary reward-in the
case of injunctive relief-or very small awards. 180 Second, Congress'
attorneys' fees act applicable to civil rights actions-the Civil Rights
Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976 181-awards attorneys' fees only to
the "prevailing party."182 Prevailing in a civil rights action can be
quite difficult; plaintiffs not only must show a violation of their consti-
tutional rights, but they also must overcome any assertion on the part
of the defendant of absolute or qualified immunity. 18 -3 A plaintiff
could establish that her rights had been violated, and still not be a
"prevailing party" under § 1988; without prevailing party status, she
would be ineligible for attorneys' fees. 184 Civil rights actions, there-
fore, have difficulty attracting capable lawyers due to the inherent
177 See Nancy J. Bladich, Comment, The Revitalization of Notice Pleading in Civil
Rights Cases, 45 MERCER L. REV. 839, 843-44 (1994).
178 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 101, at 17.
179 See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging the Enforcement Gap in Constitutional Law: A
Critique of the Supreme Court's Theory That Self-Restraint Promotes Federalism, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1289, 1304 n.60 (2005) ("Congress and commentators [recognize] that
civil rights plaintiffs are disproportionately poor."); Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision of
Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J. 171, 174 (1994) (describing civil rights litigants as
"resource-poor").
180 J01IN C. JEFFRIES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS 387 (2d ed. 2007).
181 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000).
182 Id. § 1988(b).
183 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that, in order to
hold an executive officer defendant liable, the plaintiff must show not only the pres-
ence of a constitutional or statutory rights violation, but also that the fight was not
"clearly established" at the time of the incident).
184 See, e.g., Hill v. McKinley, 311 F.3d 899, 905 (8th Cir. 2002) ("Because we hold
that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claim, Hill is not a
prevailing party . . . and thus the section 1988 award of attorney's fees necessarily
fails.").
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risks involved in receiving compensation. A dearth of qualified coun-
sel could easily be affecting the quality of the pleadings being filed.
This hypothesis suggests that it is possible that Twombly has
imposed a heightened pleading standard, but one that is hidden by
the widespread pleading practices of lawyers. Given the inherent
pleading difficulties that face a civil rights plaintiff, however, civil
rights complaints are vulnerable to any increased burdens at the
pleading stage. If this hypothesis is correct, it is likely that as there are
more cases citing Twombly, a similar effect will be observed in other
substantive areas of law that have traditionally posed unique problems
for plaintiffs' attorneys.
B. Hypothesis Two: Institutional Inertia
Whereas hypothesis one accepts, arguendo, the claim that
Twombly imposes a heightened pleading standard, this hypothesis
accepts at face value the results of the study: district courts have
refused to read in Twombly a heightened pleading standard for the
vast majority of causes of action but have raised the pleading bar for
civil rights cases. The critical starting point to this hypothesis is the
claim that Twombly gives greater discretion to district court judges rul-
ing on motions to dismiss.18 5 Even a test that employs bright-line dis-
tinctions gives a judge discretion-the judge's reading of the factual
situation will inform her decision as to which side of the bright line
the case falls. The "no set of facts" test that prevailed under Conley was
highly restrictive of a judge's discretion. Ajudge could only dismiss a
complaint under that standard if it appeared "beyond doubt" that the
plaintiff could prove "no set of facts that would entitle him to
relief."18 6 Taking the language literally, this would only allow for dis-
missal if the plaintiff pled himself out of court (pled facts that facially
contradicted his legal theory) or failed even to give fair notice. The
Twombly plausibility standard, however, invites judicial discretion.
There is no scientific definition of "plausibility"; what one judge finds
plausible another might find fanciful.
The question thus becomes how a judge would apply a Supreme
Court standard that, at best, created "some uncertainty" as to the
extent to which it broke with the previous standard.18 7 Ajudge facing
that level of uncertainty could be expected (perhaps based on the fear
185 See Davis, supra note 101, at 18.
186 See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
187 See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d Cir. 2007).
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of being reversed)1 88 to err on the side of applying the standard in a
familiar way-in other words, to apply the new standard in a way that
closely resembles the previous standard. The Court in Twombly
retired the "no set of facts" standard after finding that it had
"puzzl[ed] the profession for 50 years."' 89 While the Conley standard
may have puzzled first-year law students for fifty years, the judges who
have been applying the standard have seemingly mastered it-apply-
ing it so often, in fact, that it has become the fourth most cited case in
the federal judiciary.' 90 It is not a stretch to believe that ajudge, fac-
ing a decision that, while unarguably jettisoning the language of the
previous standard, was unclear as to the proper substance of the stan-
dard, would require a more unequivocal statement from the Supreme
Court before she altered her longstanding practices.
This serves to explain why the Twombly decision has not had a
wide-ranging effect. It does not explain, and even may contradict, the
apparent effect in the civil rights cases. However, the federal judici-
ary's treatment of civil rights cases has always been unique. Despite
specific Supreme Court holdings that disclaimed any heightened
pleading standard for civil rights cases, numerous circuits applied,
and continue to apply, a heightened standard to cases brought under
various civil rights statutes. 191 The Second Circuit, in a recent case
applying Twombly, articulated a major policy consideration that has
motivated some courts to apply a heightened pleading standard to
these complaints. Government officials, the majority of civil rights
defendants, are afforded a qualified immunity from suit that is
intended to allow them to "carry out their public roles effectively with-
out fear of undue harassment by litigation." 92 A liberal pleading stan-
dard that could allow government officials to be haled into court on a
"thin" complaint would defeat the important policy concerns behind
qualified immunity. Thus, it may be that district court judges, having
recently obtained a mandate from the Supreme Court to exercise dis-
cretion more liberally than in the past, are exercising that discretion
in a focused manner to effect an important policy consideration.
188 See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 77-78 (1994) (finding thatjudges dis-
like being reversed because of: (1) the fear that their colleagues and scholars will
disrespect their legal abilities; (2) the fear that a high reversal rate will impede profes-
sional recognition or advancement; and (3) the perception that high reversal rates
will undercut their judicial power).
189 Bell AtI. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1969 (2007).
190 See Steinman, supra note 18, at 143.
191 See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
192 Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 158.
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C. Hypothesis Three: Twombly as Post-Hoc Approval
The final hypothesis draws an analogy with another major set of
precedents from the Supreme Court in the civil procedure realm. In
1986, the Supreme Court issued three opinions that have become
known as the Celotex Trilogy.193 In these three cases the Supreme
Court appeared "intent on overcoming any hesitancy in the use of
summary judgment."194 These three cases have been "widely viewed
as a turning point in the use of summary judgment."' 95 Joe Cecil,
Rebecca Dye, Dean Miletich, and Professor Rindskopf, however, in
their study of summary judgment practice in six district courts over
twenty-five years (1975-2000) found that the filing of summary judg-
ment motions increased in the years before the Trilogy and changed
very little following the decisions. 196 This study suggests, therefore,
that whatever changes were occurring in the judicial approach to sum-
mary judgment motions were the result of other factors and not of a
sudden pronouncement by the Supreme Court.'
97
It is certainly plausible that an effect similar to that which pre-
vailed before and immediately following the Celotex Trilogy is repeat-
ing itself twenty-one years later with 12(b)(6) motions. Certainly,
district court and appeals court judges have grappled with applying
heightened pleading standards for a variety of policy rationales in a
number of circumstances, as the case histories of Leatherman and
Swierkiewicz demonstrate. 198 Specifically, the policy concerns found
persuasive by the Supreme Court in Twombly (namely the risk of
expensive and abusive discovery when there is little hope of finding
factual support)199 have always been a concern of the federal
judiciary.20
0
193 The Trilogy is made up of the cases Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986),
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
194 Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal
District Courts, 4J. EMPIRIcAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 866 (2007).
195 Id. at 862.
196 See id. at 881.
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of greater judicial involvement in civil case management, and the growing focus on
motion practice" may explain the changes they observed. Id.
198 See supra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
199 See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
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It is possible, in light of the above, that the district courts, faced
with growing dockets and ever more complex cases, have gradually
succumbed to policy considerations of efficiency and speed. If this
has happened, it is likely that the Conley standard the district courts
have been applying to test the sufficiency of pleadings in the years
immediately prior to Twombly differ from the Conley standard applied
by the courts in its first decades. A larger, longitudinal study would be
required to test the viability of this hypothesis. If this is, in fact, what
has been occurring, Twombly is not a Supreme Court statement of a
changed standard, but rather the Supreme Court feeling the pressure
from lower courts and finally giving its approval to an ongoing
practice.
CONCLUSION
So is Twombly worthy of the debate and discussion it has engen-
dered? On one hand, it is possible to answer this question negatively
by citing the relatively focused effect of the decision. To write off the
Twombly decision, however, as little more than a linguistic reformula-
tion of the previous standard would be shortsighted. This decision is,
in terms of Supreme Court precedent, a newborn. The understand-
ing and application of the sufficiency standard articulated by Conley
were the result of fifty years of academic and judicial development.
The language of Twombly, hinging on amorphous principles such as
"plausibility," provides great leeway to judicial interpretation. There is
no predicting how the next generation of judges, who will have "puz-
zled" over this language instead of the Conley language, will read
"plausibility."
In 1947, Judge Learned Hand handed down the decision in
United States v. Carroll Towing Co.20 1 in which he articulated a standard
for determining negligence that factored in the probability of injury,
the gravity of the injury should it occur, and the burden on the defen-
dant of acting with due care. 202 This decision did not garner a lot of
attention at the time. However, eighteen years later, the second
Restatement of Torts adopted this standard,203 and it is now a bedrock of
tort law in the United States.20 4 That a Supreme Court precedent has
not had a far-reaching immediate impact on the lower courts does not
mean that it will not eventually. If left without further instruction
201 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
202 See id. at 173.
203 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965).
204 See PatrickJ. Kelley, The Carroll Towing Company Case and the Teaching of Tort
Law, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 731, 732-33 (2001).
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from the Court, lower courts may eventually exercise the discretion
inherent in the Twombly plausibility language to trade away the liberal
ethos motivating the Federal Rules to further efficiency concerns. If,
as Judge Clark stated in the epigraph to this Note, every generation
struggles with the temptation to impose a heightened pleading stan-
dard, what Twombly may do is provide the next generation with a man-
date to succumb to that temptation.
In a more immediate sense, the results of this study demonstrate
that there is reason to be wary of the Twombly decision right now. Con-
gress since the Civil War has not only articulated broad swaths of civil
rights that are protected from intrusion, it has also sought, through
instrumentalities like 42 U.S.C. § 1988, to encourage the enforcement
of these rights. Without access to courts, these broad civil protections
are not worth the paper they are printed on. If the lower courts are,
as this study suggests, applying the Twombly language in such a way as
to impose a higher burden on civil rights plaintiffs, the practical effect
of this reality is to close the courts to a large number of plaintiffs.
Ultimately, therefore, this study suggests that this procedural, linguis-
tic alteration is having the same effect, though comparatively under
the radar, as a legislative rolling back of civil rights.
This Note is a first step in an empirical evaluation of Twombly's
effects. It is also a call for expansive, continued study of the decision
as time progresses. Regardless of judicial disagreement on how to
word the standard, it is beyond debate that the major goal of the Fed-
eral Rules' approach to pleading was to prevent pleading technicali-
ties from preventing the enforcement of the substantive law. It
cannot be forgotten that substance and procedure are inexorably
intertwined.
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